Abstract: This paper reexamines the use of US commodity futures price data to show that the US deflation of 1929 to 1932 was at best no more than partially anticipated by economic actors. By focusing on the expected real interest rate, these studies provide some empirical support for explanations of the Great Depression that are not exclusively monetary in nature. However, these studies did not consider the context and the market microstructures from which the data was sourced.
I. Introduction
In economics there remains a significant controversy over the causes of the length and depth of the Great Depression, as well as the role, if any, of the severe deflation from 1930 to 1933. On one side, Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963) argue for a strictly monetary cause. Others, while agreeing partially with the monetarists, point to other important transmission effects, such as the loss of banks as credit information holders (e.g. Bernanke 1983 or Fisher 1933 . Finally, there are those, mostly Keynesians, who reject the monetarist explanation, and focus on the role of secular shocks (e.g. Peter Temin 1976) . There are significant problems with a strictly monetarist explanation. Specifically, Friedman and Schwartz comment on but can not fully explain the decline the velocity of money during the period, nor are some convinced that the direction of causality runs from money supply declines to real output declines (Temin 1976 ). An additional problem with the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis is that interest rates during the Great Depression were too low to indicate the severe monetary contraction that the US Federal Reserve is accused of accelerating (Temin 1976) . The counter argument, voiced by Brunner (1981) is that, as economic agents expected deflation after 1929, real interest rates ex ante were actually quite high. However, at first, economists lacked the tools to measure inflation expectations. By the 1980s, Frederic Mishkin and James Hamilton brought together the concept of 'rational expectations' (RE) with the latest in financial theory, the 'efficient markets hypothesis' (EMH) 1 , to address such questions as price expectations and their role in economics.
1 Interestingly, though often viewed as identical, the development of RE and the EMH were quite separate. Even Merton Miller, who sat on the PhD committees of both the generallyaccepted founders of RE (Muth, at Carnegie Tech) and EMH (Fama, at Chicago) , did not connect the two theories at first (Hoover and Young 2013) .
John Muth (1961) exhorted economists to 'model agents as if they know the model' (Hoover and Young 2011) . That is, 'if economic variables are determined by an identifiable on-going process then sooner or later intelligent economic agents will recognize the process and will then model their expectations in the light of that process' (Shaw 1987) . Academics studying expected inflation in the 1980s examined interest rate (e.g. Cecchetti 1992 ) and commodity price (Hamilton 1992 ) data for potential measures of expected future inflation.
Another line of attack for those looking for market expectations of inflation utilized the then new tools of finance that posited that all information was fully discounted into the market price of a stock, bond or commodity contract (Fama 1965 ). As such a market-determined prices would already reflect the expectation of future performance.
James Hamilton (1987) appears to be the first to marry conceptions of the EMH from such adherents as Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (1987) , with (we argue reductionist) understandings of agricultural commodities futures market to examine the broader implication of commodity price movements on expected economy-wide price level changes. In his early naïve study of commodity markets in 1987 Hamilton shows that, for example, the wheat futures market was 'predicting' a 19.9% annualized own inflation rate in May 1930, when, in fact wheat prices fell for the next five months at an annualized rate of 53.8% (See   table 3 ). He finds similar results throughout 1929 to 1932 for corn, cotton and oats as well, therefore asserting that commodity investors did not anticipate the oncoming deflation. As such, he concluded 'I am persuaded that one can convincingly rule out the hypothesis that the mechanism whereby monetary policy led to the depression in agriculture was that large anticipated deflation led to high ex ante real interest rates' (Hamilton 1987 p. 166) . '[This] seems to [cast] considerable doubt on the Keynesian interpretation' (Hamilton 1987: 166 ).
Hamilton's 1992 begins with a similar study, observing that six commodity 'markets seemed to repeat the same error [underestimating deflation] throughout 1929 -1932 ' (Hamilton 1992 . From this he concludes that such futures markets did not anticipate any deflation from 1929 to 1932 (and in fact expected commodity prices to rise). In this paper we argue that Hamilton in 1987 and in the first part of his 1992 paper misinterpreted his dataset in making such findings, and therefore the conclusions should not stand. In the second part of his 1992 study, Hamilton incorporated a RE approach to make an even more precise claim that deflation of 1930-1933 was at best partially anticipated by examining four and then three of the six commodities he analyzed in part one. Hamilton (1992: 159) states 'during the first year of the Great Depression, people anticipated stable prices, meaning that the initial deflation of the Great Depression was largely unanticipated.' This, in his view, indicates that, rather than operate through expected deflation, 'highly contractionary monetary policy… operated through unanticipated deflation' (Hamilton 1987: 145) .
It is clear that the debate surrounding unanticipated inflation remains unresolved. Hamilton (1987 Hamilton ( , 1992 sides with Dominguez, Fair and Shapiro (1988) , and Evans and Wachtel (1993) , while Cecchetti (1992) and Nelson (1990) we believe it is highly timely to revisit Hamilton's methodology, specifically the justification for using futures markets to determine expectations of real interest rates.
Our paper weighs in on the normative and empirical evidence as presented by the parties while introducing key contextual and theoretical arguments that to us appear ignored or misunderstood in the debate. It is our opinion that Hamilton's contribution to the debate should not stand. Specifically, Hamilton (1992) cites as justification for his techniques papers by French (1986) , Fama and French (1987) and Holbrook Working (1949) , yet we could not find adequate defense of his methodology therein. In fact, we argue that proper application of the empirical evidence and the theoretical framework proposed in these studies would have led to an entirely different framing of the investigation, and would likely have led
Hamilton to wholly different conclusions. Our own conclusions, though still preliminary, point to conclusions opposite to those of Hamilton.
More broadly, historical economics can, and does in the papers investigated here, suffer when historical context and the idiosyncrasies of the markets under investigation are ignored. In such instances, we as financial historians can add to the debate on policy issues of the modern day by contributing to the analysis of markets from an earlier era.
This paper first, in section two, explores the history of the study of agricultural commodity futures markets, paying specific attention to the collected works of Holbrook Working, as well specific arguments from the 'efficient markets'
school. In section three we show that there is strong reason to believe that
Hamilton's argument in the earlier part of his 1992 paper, and a dominant theme of his 1987 paper, is missing a crucial independent variable. Once we correct for the agricultural conditions of 1929-1931, Hamilton's argument that commodity markets forecast inflation rather than deflation during the early years of the Great Depression does not stand. In this section we also weigh in on the debate between Hamilton (1992) and Cecchetti (1992) on the relevance of government intervention in the futures market.
In section four we examine Mishkin's critique of the Hamilton methodology and find that, though the paper itself is flawed, we support Mishkin's (1990) argument against Hamilton's (1987) 1907, 1916 and, importantly, 1929-1932 , spot prices should (and usually do) fall below the futures price so that
Where F(t) is the second-closest futures price at time t and S(t) is the futures price for the closest future delivery date at that same time t.
In this theory of storage developed by Working (1942 Working ( , 1949 and formalized in 1958 by Lester Telser (where 'factors that affect the marginal storage cost and the marginal convenience yield thereby determine the spread [between F(t) and S(t)]'), the price differential in years of large inventories should be therefore related to the costs of storage. In lower carryover years, the 'convenience yield', the marginal value of a stockholding to a holder of a commodity in the spot market, comes into play to the point where there is no upper bound to which the spot price can rise over the futures price in periods of short term excess demand.
For example, a miller who is worried about maintaining an adequate supply of wheat to avoid disruptions may hold a higher inventory than normal, and thus it would take a much lower futures price relative to the spot price (often referred to as the basis) to motivate the miller to reduce inventories and 'wager' that supplies may become available at a later date.
'If the effective cost of carrying wheat -that is, the marginal net cost -is thought of as a function of the supply, and if it is recognized that there is always wheat to be carried over into the next crop year… then it appears necessary to think of the price of the May [near] future as always logically under the same expectations that bear on the price of the July [further] future. That is, 'maximum supplies can bring about unusual discounts only to the point where carrying costs of marginal hedgers are fully met. For this reason, futures discounts have a fairly well defined lower limit in contrast to futures premiums, which have no marginal upper limit when supplies appear inadequate' (Hoffman 1941) .
Note that in the above formulation, having a positive price differential does not imply that actors expect the spot price, S(t) to rise to F(t) by the farther delivery date t+1, but only that, once on of F(t) or S(t) incorporates all relevant information, the other is set so that the marginal holder can earn a risk-free profit from storing the historically large inventories. This is a subtle but important difference from Hamilton's interpretation of Working (1949) , as we shall see. To restate, according to the theory, the future price, F(t) is set by expectations based on all available information, and then, in years of high carryover, S(t) must take into account all of the influences on F(t) but also allow for storage costs (which can be net positive or negative). The marginal holder will therefore buy and hold grain in storage even if E[S(t+1)] > S(t). On the other hand, the buyer of the grain for future delivery is likely a higher cost storer than the current marginal storer in the example above. As such, this buyer for future delivery may pay above E[S(t+1)] instead of buying the spot market. F(t) greater than S(t) is thus the 'no arbitrage condition', regardless of expectations. Now, the costs of carry are different for each actor, and (likely) increase as more and more storage is required (increasing marginal costs). In contemporary studies (Working and Hobe 1929; Working 1934) , storage costs were estimated at between zero and two cents per bushel for wheat. As such, we should, and often do, see wheat futures prices one to two cents higher per bushel per month than spot. We should further see, and do see in table 2, reasonably stable bases (F -S) during periods when grain carryover is known and high. As Working (1942: 50) wrote; 'relations between futures prices… indicate merely the market appraisal of price changes that are likely to occur in consequence of anticipated marginal net costs of carrying the commodity.' Interestingly, in 1907, the futures price (July) rose 25% while in 1930 prices fell 6% over these nine weeks. In both cases, the spread was remarkably stable. Also, crop carryover in 1930 was 50% higher than in 1907. Therefore, applying the theory of storage one would expect the spread in 1930 to be higher than in 1907. Source -Working (1934) This cost of carry in years of high carryover causes the shape of F(t) -S(t) in interwar years to follow what is now know as the 'Working Curve' as in figure 1.
Work done by the Commodities Exchange Administration (1938) found the same shape for corn markets as well, while Brennan (1958) identified the same phenomenon in the oats market. It must be noted that if the old crop/new crop relationship can be shown to be a function of the crop carryover, the relationship must also be true of 'intracrop' spreads, or those that do not bridge a new harvest.
Importantly, when examining the demand and supply for storage (and therefore its costs for each commodity) it is important to note that wheat, corn, rye and oats compete for the same storage facilities. As such, high crop carryover for wheat would impact the cost of storage for other commodities if they, too, were in oversupply.
C. Efficient Futures Markets
We now ask 'to what extent are futures prices forecasts?' given 'futures prices are not independently established forecasts for various maturity months, but are linked to each other and to cash prices'? (Tomek 1997 ) Quite early on in his studies, and certainly before the emergence of Fama (1965) , Working found that futures prices could be unpredictable, and additionally provided theoretical evidence that Cowles and Jones's (1937) findings in the equity market could be explained by a random walk (Working 1960) if the model were properly specified and there were theoretical reasons to expect it. Indeed, there is a significant body of students of the history of agricultural economics and finance who would argue that Holbrook Working should get credit rather than, say, Eugene Fama for the EMH.
It is almost gospel that the futures price is an unbiased estimator of the future spot price, but it has to be remembered that the current spot price may be even more efficient. Tomek and Gray (1970) conclude the futures markets do not incorporate any 'prophecy that is not reflected in the cash price. ' Tomek (1997) Importantly, while some, including Hamilton (1992) , interpret French (1986) and Fama and French (1987) to conclude that the futures price less the spot price is the market's view of own commodity price deflation, French actually concurs with Working's more sophisticated characterization. That is, French (1986) agrees that there is a convenience yield, and that the cost of storage needs to be considered as per the Working Curve: 'Futures prices cannot provide reliably better forecasts [than spot prices] unless the variance of the expected spot price is large relative to the variance of the actual spot price changes. This relative variance is related to a number of factors, including… the cost of storage' (French 1986: S39) . This cost of storage 'equals the physical storage cost…minus the marginal convenience yield' (French 1986: S41) . That is, for commodities with low physical carry costs, when stocks are high, the convenience yield is zero, and the variance of the spot price and the futures price will be quite similar. With the spot and futures prices therefore under the same influences, it is highly unlikely that the basis (F -S) tells us anything at all in cases of high crop carryover. Fama and French (1985) Hamilton (1992) chooses to examine, French (1986) found that only one had "good" (and none have 'strong') forecasting power. Separately, Fama and French (1987) also find that only one of Hamilton's commodities should have 'strong' forecasting power.
To summarize this section, we can conclude that the futures and the spot price will have some relationship to each other in commodities with low storage costs and/or in times of high inventory carryover.
Futures Data in the Context of the Great Depression
Hamilton examined the difference between F(t) and S(t) in select agricultural commodity markets 3 of the 1920s and 1930s every four months (Hamilton 1992) or once a year for a five month period (Hamilton 1987) and used the log difference to calculate the implied expectations of own price deflation or inflation of each commodity. Hamilton then compared this expected price change to the actual commodity's own price change, or S(t+1) -S(t). His results are reproduced in table I of Hamilton (1992) (reproduced here as table 3) and table 4 of Hamilton (1987) (reproduced here as table 4). Hamilton concludes that, as expected own price inflation was positive by his measure even while commodity prices were falling, people did not appear to have anticipated the deflation in the general economy. 3 Hamilton actually uses the future maturing in the observation month as a proxy for the spot price S(t). 
(t) -S (t) was much higher than S (t+1) -S (t) were
also years of high carryover (Working 1949 Hamilton mischaracterized the fundamentals of the wheat market during the Great Depression. However, Fama and French (1997) and Fama (1986) showed that all storable commodities should exhibit similar behaviour to Working's wheat market (that is, in times of high carryover). Additionally, as oats, rye and corn compete for storage space for wheat, wheat being in general oversupply during the early years of the Great Depression, we would expect the economics of storage to apply in these other grains as well. Note that this can be true even in falling markets (see table 3 and figure 2). In Working's own words; 'the price difference between two futures has widely been interpreted as indicating the market's appraisal of expected price change. A principal result of our investigations of price relations in both the Chicago and the Liverpool futures markets has been to show that this assumption is a mistaken one' (Hoos and Working 1940) .
It is of course also possible that the market was particularly inefficient during the period in question. In fact, there is a very interesting debate in the literature between Cecchetti (1992) and Hamilton (1991) concerning the involvement of the US government in the wheat and cotton markets during the Great Depression.
Cecchetti (1992) claims that rationality and efficiency should not be possible to Given this evidence, we have a hard time understanding how Hamilton dismisses the effects of US government intervention so casually.
The only reasonable conclusion from the above section is that Hamilton (1987 Hamilton ( , 1992 
Irrational rational expectations
Besides the methodological problems and issues with the data as stated above, there are several other problems with using futures prices as predictions of the overall price level in an economy. One of the first problems is reverse causality, which is worth a mention but will not be dealt with in depth here. It is not entirely out of the question that a fall in farm incomes due to lower agricultural prices could have exacerbated the downturn after 1929 by reducing consumption.
However, this suggestion has been dismissed by a recent study Federico (2005) .
A larger problem rests on Hamilton's (and others') reliance on rational expectations theory to model economic agents predictions of economy wide price level changes. 'The theory of rational expectations, initially developed by John Muth, asserts that both firms and individuals, as rational agents, have expectations that are optimal forecasts using all available information' (Mishkin 1981) . In its most basic form, rational expectations seems more reasonable than its predecessor, adaptive expectations, by suggesting that economic agents are able to identify and utilize easily discernable patterns in economic data (Mishkin 1981) .
As Hamilton (1987) He assumes that actors knew to limit their analysis to four commodities, two extremely obscure and none of them in the top two of traded futures. Specifically, it is not obvious that agents have the ability to identify complex interactions within an economy, and Hamilton's simplest model incorporates 52 parameters.
Hamilton effectively states that actors could legitimately forecast inflation by looking at four rather randomly chosen commodity futures prices as well as a two-period serial correlation in the price index itself. This can be criticized on several fronts. Firstly, Mishkin (1990) shows that it does not seem at all plausible from the evidence that even the larger commodities should be able to 'predict' movements in the general price level. Mishkin points to the fact that commodities prices are much more volatile than the economy-wide price index. In fact, because commodities are often far too volatile to be of any use in predicting the price level in the economy, practitioners often use "core" consumer prices that exclude food and energy (Motley 1997) . Mishkin evaluated Hamilton's methodology by using 'futures market data for contracts on individual commodities to examine real interest rate behaviour.' He finds that the real rate of return implied by individual futures markets is highly volatile 4 , and therefore unlikely to be useful to estimate market participant's predictions of future changes in aggregate price indices.
Hamilton (1992) counters that this is not an insurmountable problem, as his regression coefficients can account for the higher volatility of the individual futures markets relative to the aggregate price levels in the economy. The problem with Hamilton's defense, however is that certainly the predictive ability of futures is both a theoretical and empirical question.
The second problem with the rational expectations assumption is that there is no theory which supports Hamilton's choice of four, narrowed down to three commodities, used by economic agents to predict economy-wide changes in the price level. Hamilton appears to have taken the available price data and datamined for the optimal model. What would make any economic agent focus on three commodity prices to estimate inflation and deflation in uncertain times?
Hamilton gives us no reason for choosing the original six commodities of his 1992 paper, and his reduction to four and then three using data mining is theory free. This is where the crude application of RE becomes problematic. Hamilton chooses four commodities -rye, lard, corn and oats -that are far from obviously the prime drivers of an economy and are, further, not as liquid (and therefore likely less efficient) than other alternatives (e.g. wheat and cotton). It seems highly unlikely that investors and other economic agents constantly updated their forecasts for price level changes in the US economy as a whole based mostly on the price of two important (yet not the most important) and two unimportant agricultural products. Again, wheat and cotton are ignored in the important analyses in the bulk of Hamilton's 1992 paper. Tellingly, from 1923 to 1938 trading volumes for wheat futures, ignored in the study, were more than 30 times those of rye and more than 10 times those of oats (see table 1 ).
This bring us to the third problem with RE related to the second, and that is that mathematically it is hard to argue that the prices of oats, corn rye and lard determine the price level in the economy, as less than 10% of the price index consisted of all agricultural commodities combined. Work by Joel Popkin (1974) and others shows the complexity involved in such an exercise for a larger number of very important commodities. However, of course, lard, oats, corn and rye, being only small components of the agricultural economy, would have even less of an effect on the CPI than wheat or cotton. Corn, specifically, is even more problematic as it is predominantly used for animal feed and it is not proven that price increases in such commodities cause the price level of animals to rise or fall.
That is, the corn/hog cycle predicts that falling net food prices may result if the slaughter of animals fed on corn rises due to the increasing cost of feed (Davenant 1696 ).
Tesler ( The difficulties in assessing what agents could have 'known' and when without resorting to anachronistic theories and models led many otherwise orthodox economists to question rational expectations almost from its inception (Hoover and Young 2013) . Importantly, even Muth in his later years was far from convinced that such an approach was legitimate (Hoover and Young 2013) . The intuition behind the criticism as applied to Hamilton's work is that Hamilton is assuming actors could ascertain a complex relationship between the prices of three reasonably unimportant commodities, adjusted for seasonality and combine this with a short term trend following system to deduce the potential for changes in the economy-wide price index. The only logic for this model is that it maximizes the chosen likelihood function. However, it can not at all be surprising that some model might fit the data without being a true representation of the relationships underlying the price action.
Extending the EMH
Hamilton attempts to build on French's (1986) and Fama and French's (1987) work on the efficiency of commodities markets, yet, as we argued above, we believe he grossly misinterpreted their work. We have already shown above that F -S can not, at least in the context of crop carryovers during the Great Depression, tell us much about the expectations of economic agents. However, that does not mean we can not use the EMH to understand market expectations during prior to the Great Depression. The efficient markets hypothesis (Fama 1965) actually asserts that the futures price (and not the difference between the futures and spot price) will adjust immediately to the expectations of the market participants. As per Working's theory of storage, if we think of both S(t) and F(t)
as, together (and not as a difference), providing information as to expectations of future prices, it is trivial to examine the spot and/or futures markets to identify rapid adjustments to new conditions. In figure 5 we show that the wheat futures believe it is very good evidence against Hamilton's (1987 and assertion that commodity markets were forecasting inflation during this period, either in the wider economy or in the individual commodities themselves.
Conclusions
In We showed that futures prices fell considerably well ahead of the severe declines in the general price level. That is, futures market retreats were quite common during the interwar period, and many of these did not precede a deep depression, or even a mild recession.
Even so, major falls in wheat prices do appear to be associated with future deflation. EMH did hold, and commodity markets did, in fact, anticipate deflation. Again, though not proof positive that some might view wheat price declines as indicators of coming deflation, a simple linear regression regressing inflation of wheat price changes annually from 1920 to 1932 on one year future CPI, or even a simple nonlinear regression from 1920 to 1928, hints at a significant fit at the 95% confidence interval (see figure 6 for 1920-1928 data).
For simple linear regression of CPI change on wheat price change lagged one period for the 13 data points from 1920 to 1932 generates an R squared of 56% and a 95% confidence interval of the x intercept of between 0.053 and 0.206.
Adding in a squared term to the independent variable, the R squared rises to 75%
and both Wheat and Wheat squared have coefficients that are significant at the 95% level. Of course, we remain somewhat skeptical of the usefulness of these conclusions given the small sample size (13).
Using the same tools as those available to James Hamilton, especially the EMH of 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 Annual change Year on year change in wheat price (annual)
US CPI Wheat

